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SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS--COUNSEL
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
STATE COURT AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S POWER
TO VACATE AND REMAND
Wood v. Georgia, 101 S. Ct. 1097 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 1981, the United States Supreme Court in Wood v.
Georgia,1 vacated and remanded the decision of a lower court because of
its failure to inquire about possible conflicting interests of the attorney
for the defendants. Wood represents the Court's first application of the
recently formulated rule dealing with trial courts' duty to inquire into
counsel conflicts of interest.2 The case was before the Supreme Court to
resolve the question of whether it is constitutional under the equal pro-
tection clause to imprison probationers because of their inability to
make installment payments on fines. In reviewing the trial records of
the petitioners, the Court found numerous signs of possible counsel con-
flict of interest. Petitioners had not raised the question of ineffective
assistance of counsel in any lower court, and indeed had not petitioned
1 101 S. Ct. 1097 (1981).
2 On May 12, 1980, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), the Court announced
three major interpretations of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
First, it held that the same constitutional rights accrue to defendants who hire private counsel
as accrue to ones for whom the Court appoints a public defender. Id. at 344-45. Second, the
Court held that absent objection at trial, a trial judge need only initiate an inquiry into the
question of conflict of interest if he "knows or reasonably should know that a particular con-
flict exists." Id. at 347. Finally, the Court held that, in order to establish a sixth amendment
violation, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must show that an actual conflict of
interests adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Id. at 348. See Note, Sixth Amendment-
Conficts of Interest in Multiple Representation of Codefendants, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 529, 531-36
(1980), for a detailed analysis of Cuiyler v. Sullivan.
The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VI. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), the Court recognized that
"the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." In Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court held that the fourteenth amendment makes this protection
applicable to the states.
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the Supreme Court for review on that ground. The Court considered,
sua sponte, the effectiveness of counsel issue, vacated the lower court's
probation revocation judgment, and remanded the case to the state trial
court to determine if the conflict of interest tainted petitioners' counsel.a
Although the Court treated the conflict of interest question as one raised
below by the State's Solicitor,4 it also found ample support for a remand
even if the issue had not been raised below.5
Wood essentially presented a question of first impression concerning
possible conflicts of interest which were demonstrated by trial records
but were never raised by the convicted petitioners. The Court was prob-
ably correct in finding that it had the statutory authority, under section
2106,6 to vacate the judgment and remand the case in the interests of
justice, although the authorities cited by the Court are hardly "ample,"
extensive, or controlling. On the other hand, the Court's application of
the CQyler "duty of inquiry" to these facts appears to define the CuyIer
rule in an unnecessarily broad and liberal manner. Wood may now in-
crease the scope of appellate review in cases where defense counsel is
provided by interested third parties. This may result in unnecessary ju-
dicial multiplicity.
II. FACTS OF WOOD V. GEORGIA
James Tante and Edna Allen were working as the projectionist and
ticket taker, respectively, at the Plaza Theatre in Atlanta in early 1976
when they were arrested and charged with two counts of distributing
obscene materials. 7 About four months later, Raymond Wood was simi-
larly charged and arrested after he sold two magazines to a policeman
3 "[Dletermine whether the conflict of interest that this record strongly suggests actually
existed at the time of the probation revocation or earlier. If [so] ... and ... there was no
valid waiver of the right to independent counsel [the court] must hold a new revocation hear-
ing... untainted by a legal representative serving conflicting interests." 101 S. Ct. at 1104.
4 Id. at 1100 n.5, 1104 n.20. During the probation revocation hearing there were several
discussions between the court and the parties' counsel concerning the fact that petitioners'
attorney also represented and was paid by petitioners' employer. The State's Solicitor argued
that this was a conflict of interests.
5 "Even if one considers that the conflict-of-interest question was not technically raised
below, there is ample support for a remand required in the interests of justice." For this
proposition, the Court cited 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976) (authorizing the Court to "require such
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances") and other authorities.
101 S. Ct. at 1100 n.5.
6 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976) reads:
The Supreme Court. . .may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment,
decree or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the
cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require
such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
7 The defendants were arrested for violations of Georgia obscenity statute, GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-2101 (Harrison 1977 Rev.) which reads in pertinent part: "(a) A person commits
the offense of distributing obscene materials when he sells. . . publishes, exhibits or otherwise
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while working at the Plaza Adult Bookstore. There was no evidence
that any of the petitioners owned an interest in the business or that they
had any managerial responsibilities. 8
Tante and Allen were jointly tried before a jury and found guilty
on both counts; a separate jury convicted Wood. All three were then
sentenced by the same judge. Tante and Allen each received a fine of
$5,000 and two concurrent twelve month jail sentences but were granted
immediate probation. Wood received two $5,000 fines and two consecu-
tive jail sentences of twelve months and also was placed on immediate
probation.9
After these convictions were affirmed on appeal, 10 the trial court
issued orders specifying the conditions of probation. The court required
all three probationers to make $500 monthly installment payments on
their fines. The county probation officers moved for revocation of their
probations when the three probationers failed to pay the first three
monthly installments. At a hearing on this motion, the probationers ad-
mitted that they had not made the installment payments, but offered
convincing evidence of their inability to make these payments."I Their
attorney did not move for a modification of the probation conditions at
the revocation hearing. 12 Instead, he claimed that their employer had
agreed to pay for any legal representation, fines, or bonds necessitated
by their employment. This argument did not appear to be aimed at the
probationers' interest in the terms of their probations.' 3 Faced with pro-
bationers' complete failure to satisfy a condition of their probations, the
disseminates to any person any obscene material . . . knowing the obscene nature
thereof. . ."
8 101 S. Ct. at 1099. Although the record suggests that the Plaza Theatre and the Plaza
Adult Bookstore were under common ownership, id. at 1100 n.3, the State had been unable to
learn the owner's identity. Petitioners had refused to provide information about the identity
of their employers. Id. at 1102 n. 16 and accompanying text.
9 Id. at 1099.
10 Allen v. State, 144 Ga. App. 233, 240 S.E.2d 754 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 899
(1978); Wood v. State, 144 Ga. App. 236, 240 S.E.2d 743 (1977), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 899
(1978). Allen and Tante appealed on grounds of an illegal search and seizure, trial court
abuse of discretion in denying defendants' motion for severance, insufficiency of evidence, and
error in excluding an offered piece of evidence. Wood appealed on the grounds of prior
restraint of freedom of expression, and that there was only one crime committed which was
alleged twice.
I I According to their testimony, all petitioners had by that time left their jobs at the
"adult" establishments. Allen testified that her only income was $250 per month from unem-
ployment insurance. Tante testified that his income as a correction officer was $540 per
month. He had been unemployed for eight months before obtaining that job. Wood testified
that he was trying to support a family and earning $120 per week working at a truck and
trailer rental yard. 101 S. Ct. at 1099 n.2.
12 Id. at 1102. A motion for modification of the probation conditions was made one day
before petitioners were due to be incarcerated. This motion was denied.
13 Id. at 1100-01 nn.6-10 and accompanying text.
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trial court decided to revoke those probations unless the arrearages were
made up within five days. When the fines remained unpaid, the court
finally ordered Tante, Allen, and Wood to serve their remaining jail
sentences. 
14
The revocation decision was affirmed by the Georgia Court of Ap-
peals.' 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether it is constitutional under the equal protection clause to im-
prison a probationer solely because of his inability to make installment
payments on fines.'
6
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 majority, found Wood an inappropri-
ate case in which to decide the equal protection issue. 17 The majority
avoided the constitutional question by remanding the case to the trial
court for a factual determination of whether the petitioners' sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been infringed
when the trial judge failed to inquire concerning possible conflicts of
interest of petitioners' counsel. Justice Powell wrote the majority opin-
ion, and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Stevens also filed a separate concurring
opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, and Justice
Stewart filed separate opinions, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, which would have disposed of the case by finding the Georgia ob-
scenity statute facially unconstitutional. Justice White filed a lengthy
dissent which challenged the reasoning and the result of the majority
decision.
The majority found a possible due process violation in the failure of
the probation revocation judge to intervene to assure either conflict-free
counsel or a valid waiver of this constitutional right when the possibility
of an attorney conflict of interest became obvious. Cuyler imposed this
sixth amendment duty upon trial courts so as to guarantee a criminally
accused his right to "[a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defense."' 8 The
Wood majority concluded:
[T1he record does demonstrate that the possibilgy of a conflict of interest
was sufficiently apparent at the time of the revocation hearing to impose
upon the court a duty to inquire further.... Sullivan mandates a reversal
when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it knows or
14 Id. at 1100.
15 Wood v. State, 150 Ga. App: 582, 258 S.E.2d 171 (1979).
16 Wood v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 951 (1980).
17 101 S. Ct. at 1100.
18 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
See notes 2 supra, 28 & accompanying text infra.
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reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists. 19
Justice Powell found facts in the record which, when considered in
total, should have alerted the revocation hearing judge to the possibility
of a conflict of interest. The judge should have become suspicious when
he learned during the hearing about the petitioners' employer's role in
the petitioners' representation.20 The disproportionately large fines,
which presumably resulted because of counsel's choice of arguments to
the court should also have triggered suspicion. Finally, the court's
awareness that the employer had provided petitioners' counsel and that
counsel was pressing an equal protection attack (apparently in the best
interest of the employer) rather than an argument for leniency to obtain
substantial reductions in or deferrals of the employees' fines, likewise
should have alerted the judge to a possible conflict of interests. Justice
Powell declared that "[a]ny doubt as to whether the court should have
been aware of the problem is dispelled by the fact that the State raised
the conflict problem explicitly and requested that the court look into
it."21
Justice Powell, speculating about the nature of the petitioners' em-
ployer's interest, initially considered the possibility that a test case was
being developed. Finding it strange that the employer refused to pay
the fines while continuing to post appeal bonds, Justice Powell believed
that the employer might have been seeking a resolution of the equal
protection claim for his own benefit. 22 Favorable resolution of this
claim would mean that operators of "adult" establishments could escape
the burden of paying fines imposed on indigent employees arrested for
violations of the obscenity statutes. To obtain such a favorable ruling, it
was first necessary for petitioners to receive fines beyond their own
means and then risk imprisonment by failing to pay. Thus, in order to
set up a test case, the employer would want large fines imposed and
would want the attorney to place the petitioners in jeopardy of incarcer-
ation for failure to pay. Although the majority acknowledged that it
19 101 S. Ct. at 1104 n.18 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347).
20 The facts of petitioners' employer's involvement referred to by the Court include:
1) petitioners all having been represented since the time of their arrests by a single lawyer
supplied by their employer; 2) petitioners' testimony that legal representation, payment of
fines, and posting of bonds had been promised by their employer; and, 3) petitioners' failure
to pay even small amounts toward their fines or to show concern at the size of them. 101 S.
Ct. at 1100-01.
During oral argument at the Supreme Court, petitioners' lawyer conceded that he had
been paid by the employer during petitioners' trials. He indicated that these payments
stopped when petitioners went on probation and left their jobs with this employer, but he
never dispelled the implication that he had an ongoing employment arrangement with the
employer. 101 S. Ct. at 1100-01 n.8.
21 Id. at 1104. See note 32 infra.
22 Id. at 1101.
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could not be sure that the employer and its attorney were attempting to
bring a test case that was not in the best interest of the petitioners, it
found that the circumstances were nevertheless ample to show a "clear
possibility of conflict of interest .... "23
The Court found a clear possibility of conflicting interests even
without the test-case motive. The employer's refusal to pay the fines for
any reason put the attorney in a position of conflicting obligations.
Counsel may not have made a leniency argument because it would have
required him to stress that the employer had acted in bad faith toward
petitioners by reneging on its promise to pay. Moreover, this argument
might have forced counsel to emphasize the possibly improper relation-
ship between himself, employer, and petitioners. 24 Finally, the majority
recognized that whenever an operator of an alleged criminal enterprise
provides counsel for his accused employees, the attorney may prevent
the accuseds from offering testimony which would be beneficial to them
but contrary to the best interests of their employer.25 The majority spec-
ulated that this happened in Wood.
Thus, the majority held that the factual setting in Wood required it
to "take note of the potential unfairness resulting from this particular
third-party fee arrangement. '26 In earlier cases, the Court had held
that an assurance that an unnamed employer would pay fines and other
costs established indigent petitioners' right to representation by ap-
pointed counsel at any probation revocation hearing.27 Where this con-
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1102 n. 14. See also id. at 1105 (Stevens, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 1102-03 & n.15. The Court cited In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand
Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 606 n.II (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Abrams, 56 N.J. 271, 276, 266 A.2d 275,
278 (1970); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1083 (1976); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrY DR 5-107 (A), (B), EC
5-23 (1976); 1 ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE § 4-3.5(c) (1971); Low-
enthal,Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REv. 939, 960-61
(1978).
26 101 S. Ct. at 1103.
Petitioners were mere employees, performing the most routine duties, yet they received
heavy fines on the apparent assumption that their employer would pay them. They now
face prison terms solely because of the employer's failure to pay the fines, having been
represented throughout by a lawyer hired by that employer.
Id.
27 The sixth amendment right to "assistance of counsel" reaches only "criminal prosecu-
tions" expressly. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See note 2 supra. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
788 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court adopted a standard for
deciding when due process requires appointment of counsel for indigent offenders during
probation revocation hearings. Recognizing that the need for counsel at revocation hearings
derives from the peculiarities of particular cases, it left it to the state tribunals to identify, case
by case, the situations in which fundamental fairness requires appointed counsel. 411 U.S. at
790. Scarpelli established a presumption in favor of appointment of counsel in cases where
there are substantial reasons which justify the probation (or parole) violation and make revo-
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stitutional due process right to counsel exists, the Court declared that
there is a correlative, sixth amendment right to representation free from
conflicts of interest.28 The Court could not be sure from the record
whether an actual conflict of interest had affected the strategic decisions
of petitioners' counsel, but it was sufficiently convinced that a possible
conflict, apparent at the time of the revocation hearing, imposed a duty
to inquire upon the trial judge.29 Because the trial court failed to in-
quire, the Supreme Court vacated its probation revocation order,30 and
remanded the case.
3'
In order to exert jurisdiction over the due process issue, the major-
ity considered the conflict of interest issue as one sufficiently raised by
the State's Solicitor during the probation revocation hearing.3 2 Even
though the issue had not been raised on appeal below nor included as a
question in the petition for certiorari, Justice Powell believed that justice
demanded that the Court consider the due process issue sua sponte be-
cause the alleged attorney conflict of interests would have kept the attor-
ney from expressly raising the issue below and preserving it on appeal.
33
The majority relied on an earlier holding in Boynton z. Virginia34 to jus-
tify its deciding a case on an issue raised in the lower court but not
preserved on appeal.
Even if the conflict of interest issue was not technically raised be-
low, the majority still would have remanded the case "in the interests of
cation inappropriate, and the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.
Id.
28 101 S. Ct. at 1103 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) and Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978)). Hollowa.y held that trial judges faced with timely objec-
tion to multiple representation in criminal prosecutions must either appoint separate counsel
or take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of a conflict of interests is too remote to
warrant separate counsel. 435 U.S. at 484.
29 101 S. Ct. at 1103-04.
30 Id. at 1104.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1100 n.5 and accompanying text. The State's Solicitor raised the issue at the
revocation hearing and in its briefs to the trial court.
33 Id. The majority readily dismissed Justice White's dissenting argument, that the con-
flict-of-interest issue had not been properly presented, by ruling:
To be sure, it was not raised on appeal below or included as a question in the petition for
certiorari. These facts merely emphasize, however, why it is appropriate for us to con-
sider the issue. The party who argued the appeal and prepared the petition for certiorari
was the lawyer on whom the conflict-of-interest charge focused. It is unlikely that he
would concede that he had continued improperly to act as counsel. And certainly the
State's Solicitor, whose duty it was to support the judgment below, could not be expected
to" do more than call the problem to the attention of the courts, as he did. Petitioners
were low level employees, and now appear to be indigent. ... We cannot assume that
they, on their own initiative, were capable of protecting their interests.
34 101 S. Ct. at 1100 n.5. In Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960), the Court
avoided two constitutional issues presented to it and decided the case instead by adopting a
statutory construction urged in the state appellate process but not raised in the Supreme
Court.
1332 [Vol. 72
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justice," citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106.35 Justice Powell evidently felt the
lower court's failure to recognize the potential conflict of interest was an
error of such magnitude that fundamental fairness required the Court to
order further proceedings which would be "just under the
circumstances.
'36
In two brief opinions, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart con-
curred in the remand, but would have reversed petitioners' convic-
tions.37 They would have held Georgia's obscenity statute facially
unconstitutional.
38
In a detailed and well articulated dissenting opinion, Justice White
found two flaws in the Court's holding.3 9 First, he denied that the Court
had jurisdiction to vacate the judgment on due process grounds. Sec-
ond, he did not agree with the majority's conclusion that the record
demonstrated a clear possibility of conflict. He eventually considered
the equal protection claim avoided by the majority and found a
violation.40
Justice White initially maintained that an absolute jurisdictional
bar prevented the Court from deciding the conflict issue. He looked to
the jurisdictional statute authorizing Supreme Court review of state
35 101 S. Ct. at 1100 n.5 and accompanying text. See also note 6 su-,r for complete text of
28 U.S.C. § 2106. The Court also cited STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
§ 6.27, at 460 (5th ed. 1978), and Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974). Stem and
Gressman state that in review of state cases "the Court doubtless limits its power to notice
plain error to those situations where it feels the error is so serious as to constitute a fundamen-
tal unfairness in the proceedings." In Vachon, the Court reversed a criminal conviction on due
process grounds after independent examination of the record pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 40(l) (d) (2)--the "plain error rule"--and a finding that evidence was completely lacking
on a key element of the offense charged. 414 U.S. at 480.
36 See note 6 sufpa. 101 S. Ct. at 1100 n.5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106).
37 101 S. Ct. at 1105 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting), (Stewart J., concurring and
dissenting).
38 Justice Brennan believes that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit states from
wholly suppressing sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly obscene con-
tents, at least absent any attempted distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to uncon-
senting adults. See McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 678 (1976) (separate opinion of
Brennan, J.); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
39 101 S. Ct. at 1105 (White, J., dissenting).
40 Id. After his attack on the majority's reasoning, Justice White reached the equal pro-
tection claim which had been rejected by the state appellate courts, but had not been reached
by the majority. Id. at 1110. He acknowledged that simply calling defendants indigent does
not insulate them from "any punishment whatsoever," but found that, in Wood, the State had
only imposed probated prison terms and fines, making payment of the fines a condition of
probation. Thus, he concluded that the ends of the State's criminal justice system did not call
for any loss of liberty except that incident to probation, and that incarceration of an indigent
for inability to pay is unconstitutional. Id. 1110-11 (citing Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)).
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court determinations. 4 1 Since the statute limits jurisdiction to claims
that have been specially set up or claimed, and upon which a state court
has reached a final decision, Justice White found an absolute jurisdic-
tional bar to the Supreme Court reaching the conflict of interest/due
process issue.42 He believed that the parties had not raised the conflict
of interest claim at the revocation hearing nor before the Georgia appel-
late courts.
43
Responding to the majority's alternative reliance on the miscellane-
ous "just under the circumstances" jurisdictional provision in section
2106,44 Justice White wrote that the "section does not purport to ex-
pand the statutory limits on the Court's jurisdiction; rather, it relates
only to the disposition of the case once jurisdiction exists. ' 4 5 He relied
for support on an earlier opinion by Justice Rehnquist 46 which stated
that in order to preserve a constitutional claim for review in the
Supreme Court, the parties must have made clear the nature of the
claim in the lower courts. Justice White concluded that the petitioners
did not assert a due process violation below, and the respondent did not
do it for them.47 Therefore, the issue was not properly before the
Supreme Court.
Justice White also ruled out Cuyer v. Sullivan48 as a source of juris-
diction over a claim otherwise beyond the Court's reach. He believed
that if the trial court should have known that a conflict of interest ex-
isted, but failed to initiate an inquiry, petitioners' proper response was-
to seek collateral relief on sixth amendment grounds in the lower
41 101 S. Ct. at 1106. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) reads in part:
Final judgments or decrees renderedby the highest court ofa state in which a decision could be
had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. . . . [b]y writ of certiorari, where .. .
any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or c/aimed under the
Constitution ...
(emphasis added).
42 101 S. Ct. at 1106 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 799 (1972); Hill v. California,
401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969), and cases cited
therein). Justice White contended that where a case comes to the Court on a writ of certiorari
to state court, § 1257 limits review jurisdiction to issues properly set up and preserved.
43 101 S. Ct. at 1106-07. justice White believed that far from suggesting that the alleged
conflict was a ground of relief for petitioners, the state suggested that petitioners and their
counsel had misled the court by pretending that the employer would pay the fines, and that
therefore they should fail in their equal protection claim. He felt it clear that no federal
constitutional claim had been made. "The sole issue in the Georgia Court of Appeals was
whether petitioners had been denied equal protection of the laws. That claim was rejected,
the judgment of revocation was affirmed and the Georgia Supreme Court denied further
review." Id. at 1107.
44 See id. at 1100 n.5. See also notes 5-6 & accompanying text supra.
45 101 S. Ct. at 1107.
46 Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. at 482 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47 101 S. Ct. at 1107-08.
48 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
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courts.
4 9
Justice White, assuming the majority's position that the Court had
jurisdiction to address the adequacy of the counsel/due process issue,
then attacked the factual findings underlying this position. He found
the test-case scenario suggested by the majority implausible, and
pointed out that, even if true, that motive would not in itself create a
conflict of interest. Rather, petitioners would have to show that it was
for the sake of that test-case objective that the employer decided not to
pay the fines, and that petitioners' attorney did not object to the size of
the fines nor move in timely fashion for modification of the conditions of
probation. 50 He found in the record suggestions of two more plausible
explanations of the employer's failure to pay the fines, neither of which
implied a conflict of interest.5 1 Justice White did not accept the major-
ity's assumption that because the employer continued to meet some but
not all of the petitioners' expenses, it was therefore manipulating the
situation to create a test case. More likely, he felt, the employer may
have reneged on its promise because the expense was simply greater
than the employer was willing to bear.52 He concluded that if the em-
ployer was unwilling to pay, then the equal protection arguments ad-
vanced by counsel may well have been the best and only arguments
available to petitioners. 53 He pointed to indications in the record that
the trial court was fully aware of petitioners' financial situation at the
time it revoked their probations, and he called the majority's conclusion
that petitioners' counsel misled the court an "artificial issue."
'5 4
IV. ANALYSIS
Both the invocation of section 2106 and the application of Cuyler in
the Wood decision represent novel applications of the law. The majority
correctly invoked the Court's jurisdiction under section 2106 to vacate
and remand this case to the state trial court. Although the authority for
this power is not as clear and "ample" as Justice Powell would lead us to
believe, the lack of precedent is due more to the unusual circumstances
necessary to trigger section 2106 jurisdiction than to a lack of power to
49 101 S. Ct. at 1108.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1109. The employer may have reneged on its promise to pay fines because peti-
tioners no longer worked for it, or because ownership of the establishment had changed
hands. See a/so id. at 1109 n.9.
52 Id. at 1109.
53 Id. This would be most true after the motion for modification of the probation condi-
tions was denied. See id. at 1109 n.l1.
54 Id. at 1109 n.10. Petitioners contended that the trial court was fully aware of their




reach new remand grounds. The manner in which the Court applied
section 2106 to the conflict of interest situation makes this portion of
Wood unique. The way in which the Court applied the duty-of-inquiry
rule to the Wood facts arguably broadens that rule beyond the original
formulation of the Cuy/er Court. This may result in a slight increase in
sixth and fourteenth amendment right-to-counsel protection at the ex-
pense of much judicial inefficiency.
A. SECTION 2106 REVIEW
Generally, an appellate court decides only the issues presented to it
by the parties.55 A number of arguments and rationales have been used
to support the general rule that appellate courts will not consider sua
sponte a legal issue not presented and urged by the litigants. The most
important rationales appear to be unfairness to the other party, the pro-
longing of litigation, the unconstitutionality of giving original jurisdic-
tion to an appellate court, and depriving appellate courts of the benefit
of lower court consideration of the matter.5 6 However, most courts in
criminal cases are willing to hazard these concerns and examine matters
sua sponte to guarantee a fair trial for the accused.57 Thus, the Supreme
Court has said, "[t]his Court in a criminal case may notice material er-
ror within its power to correct, even though that error is not specifically
challenged. ... 1 Any other policy would place the Supreme Court
in the anomalous position of giving its support to constitutionally infirm
lower court proceedings.5 9 Whenever the record clearly indicates the
infirmity of the proceeding below, and there is the possibility of negating
that injustice by remanding the case sua sponte, the Court is faced with
a strong case for considerating an issue not raised by the litigants even
though it necessitates a remand and new proceeding.6° Undoubtedly,
the constitutional guarantee of due process outweighs the judicial con-
55 See, e.g., Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S.
437, 438 (1969). See also Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L.
REv. 477, 481, 487 (1959).
56 Note, Raising New Issues on Appeal, 64 HARv. L. REv. 652, 654-55 (1951). Other argu-
ments include unfairness to the trial court, failure to punish negligence, and depriving the
other party of his right to a jury trial. Id.
57 Vestal, supra note 55, at 506.
58 Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1946). See also Wiborg v. United States,
163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896) ("although this question was not properly raised. . . if a plain error
was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to
correct it").
59 Cf. Note, supra note 56, at 661 (dealing with attempts to recover on contracts which
were void as against public policy). Appellate courts generally will hear a new defense where
an attempt is made to recover on an agreement which is void as against public policy. Any
other policy would place courts in the position of giving their support to illegal contracts.
60 Id.
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venience of not retrying cases. Furthermore, where, as in Wood, the case
is remanded with instructions for further determinations by the lower
court, all concerns about unfairness to the lower court and the other side
as well as the constitutionality of original jurisdiction in appellate courts
fall away.
61
In Wood, eight of the nine Justices readily found sufficient discre-
tion in the miscellaneous "just under the circumstances" jurisdictional
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2106,62 to remand on the due process/ conflict of
interest ground. Several federal courts of appeal have likewise reversed
or remanded on grounds not raised on appeal.63 This appellate discre-
tion is exercised sparingly, but is not absent.64
The two cases cited by the majority in support of its jurisdictional
holding provide only indirect precedent for the proposition that the
61 See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) where the Supreme Court stated:
The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal
is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts
of individual cases. . . .Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate
court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as. .. where "injustice might
otherwise result." Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. at 557. . . . [T]his is not such a case.
The issue resolved by the Court of Appeals has never been passed upon in any decision of
this Court. This being so, injustice was more likely to be caused than avoided by decid-
ing the issue without petitioner's having had an opportunity to be heard.
As can be seen from Singleton, the Supreme Court has acknowledged appellate discretion
to solve new issues where justice requires, but it is concerned about this approach where the
law on the subject is less than clear ("never been passed on. . .[by] this Court. This being
so, injustice was more likely to be caused than avoided."). In Wood, the law regarding a trial
court's duty to inquire into possible conflicts of interest had been clearly articulated in Cu Iyer
v. Sullivan. Se note 2 supra.
62 See note 6 sufira for text of the provision. See also text accompanying notes 32-36 suira.
63 See K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 1974) ("no rigid and
undeviating practice under which courts. . . decline to consider all questions. . . not previ-
ously. . . urged. Indeed there could not be without doing violence" to § 2106); Becton v.
United States, 412 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. United States, 411 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir.
1969); Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1961); accord, Hormel v. Helvering, 312
U.S. 552 (1941) (decided under 26 U.S.C. § 1141 (c)(1) (Supp. 1939), providing that Circuit
Courts of Appeals shall have power to affirm, modify, or reverse decisions of the Board of Tax
Appeals, "as justice may require"). Cf. E. I. DuPont De Nemours v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855
(10th Cir. 1949) (concluding inherent power to reverse and remand on ground not raised on
appeal). See also STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 35, § 6.27 at 460:
This power to notice plain error, at least in the review of federal court proceedings, has
been held limited to exceptional circumstances where the errors "seriously affect the fair-
ness, integrity or public reputation of public proceedings." While that standard has not
been so clearly articulated in the review of state court proceedings, the Court doubtless
limits its power to notice plain error to those situations where it feels the error is so
serious as to constitute a fundamental unfairness in the proceedings.
(citations omitted).
64 However, the Supreme Court and several courts of appeals have also dismissed ques-
tions not decided below or properly set up for review. See, e.g., Hill v. California, 401 U.S.
797, 805 (1971); Miller v. Avirom, 384 F.2d 319, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rambo v. Peyton, 380
F.2d 363, 364 (4th Cir. 1967); Marshall v. United States, 321 F.2d 897, 898 (10th Cir. 1963).
These cases and others like them demonstrate the wide discretion over sua sponte review
exercised by federal courts.
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Court can remand under section 2106 on an issue not decided below or
properly set up on appeal. In Boynton v. Virginia,65 the Court decided a
case on a statutory issue raised below but not presented on appeal to the
Supreme Court, thereby avoiding broad constitutional issues tendered
by the petitioner. Boynton thus can be readily distinguished from Wood
in two ways. The Bovnton Court avoided consideration of any constitu-
tional issue by selecting the statutory ground. Furthermore, this ground
had been raised below. In Vachon v. New Hampshire,66 where the only
question presented to the Court related to the constitutionality of a state
statute, the Court made its own review of the trial record and discovered
what it considered to be a total failure of the evidence on a key element
of the charged offense.67 But, at the close of its case, the prosecution had
claimed this lack of evidence and again had so claimed in the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. Thus, the majority opinion cited no case
precedent directly in accord with the Wood result.
The Wood majority may not have needed case precedent since it
was merely pointing out a federal constitutional infirmity in the state
court's proceeding and remanding the case to the state court for that
court to deal with the problem. The Court did not reverse the substance
of a state court decision which it viewed as inconsistent with the federal
constitution; rather, it vacated a state court decision without expressing
a view as to its merits. The Wood Court based its decision on an inciden-
tal but not de minimus procedural shortcoming which violated the fed-
eral constitution.
There is a key difference between sua sponte disposition of a case and
simple remand for a determination in the state courts. Some have theo-
rized that the Court's power to consider sua sponte issues undecided by
65 364 U.S. 454 (1960); accord Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 545 n.5 (1975); Huntress
v. Huntress' Estate, 235 F.2d 205, 209 (7th Cir. 1956); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Vest, 122
F.2d 765, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1941), cerl. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941). In Bqmton, a black peti-
tioner who had been denied integrated food service in an interstate bus terminal and subse-
quently convicted in state court of a misdemeanor and fined $10, appealed his conviction on
equal protection grounds. The court decided the case by finding an Interstate Commerce Act
violation.
66 414 U.S. 478 (1974). In Vachon, appellant operator of a head shop was convicted of
"wilfully" contributing to the delinquency of a minor after a 14-year-old girl purchased a
button at his shop inscribed "Copulation Not Masturbation." The New Hampshire Supreme
Court affirmed, ruling that the "wilfully" component was satisfied by the state proving that
the accused acted voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake. The United
States Supreme Court reversed for a complete lack of evidence in the record that appellant
personally sold the button. Id. at 481.
67 Sup. CT. R. 40(1)(d)(2) reads in pertinent part:
Briefs of. . . petitioner. . . shall contain. . . [t]he questions presented for review. ...
The. . . brief may not raise additional questions or change the substance of the ques-
tions already presented. . . . Questions not presented according to this paragraph will
be disregarded, save as the court, at its option, may notice a plain error not presented.
(emphasis added).
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lower federal courts does not extend to cases such as Wood which are
under review via a writ of certiorari to state court. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Vachon,68 noted that the Court had never before considered
new issues in cases from state courts:
Whatever the import of [the plain error rule] in cases arising in the federal
courts, it surely does not give this Court the power to simply ignore the
limitations placed by 28 U.S.C. § 1257 on our jurisdiction to review final
judgments of the highest court of a State. . . . Our prior cases establish
that we will not decide. . . issues raised here for the first time on review of
state decisions.
69
Justice Rehnquist joined the majority in Wood, finding that section 2106
supplied the Court with sufficient discretion to raise the due process is-
sue sua sponte even though the Georgia courts never decided it. For
him, Vachon's sua sponte disposition of cases on grounds not properly set
up and raised on appeal may be significantly distinct from Wood's va-
cated judgments plus remand to state court for determination of a new
legal question. Only the former situation, although arguably within the
authority granted by a literal reading of section 2106, is fraught with the
many jurisdictional questions limiting federal court review of state court
actions.70 Ultimate disposition of cases on issues not decided by the
state courts presents a fundamentally different situation than does Wood.
Thus, the Wood Court ruled, under Cuyler v. Sullivan, that the revo-
cation hearing judge should have suspected and inquired about a possi-
ble attorney conflict of interest. Because the State did not inquire, it
must now reconsider the petitioners' probation status after assuring ei-
ther no conflict of interest or a valid waiver of petitioners' constitutional
right to conflict-free representation. The Supreme Court's decision in
68 414 U.S. at 483 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 483 (citation omitted). See also Vestal, supra note 55, at 492 n.67:
[T]he Court is properly cognizant that the question must be timely and properly raised
in accordance with state practice, where that practice is reasonably calculated to permit
it, unless, of course, the highest court actually entertains the question and decides it. If
the question is not so raised and the highest court of the state accordingly declines to
consider it, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to review. Moore's Judicial Code
571 (1949). See also Wines, Establishing The Basis for Appellate Review, Ill. L. Forum
135, 146 (1952), wherein the author concludes that "The federal requirement that a
federal question must be 'set up and specially claimed' and preserved for review in the
state court is more than a principle of federal appellate procedure. It marks the limits of
the United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisidiction. The United States Supreme
Court has most times held that it is without jurisdiction to review a question that was not
'set up and specially claimed' and preserved for review in the state court."
70 For elaboration of the theorized jurisdictional questions see note 59 & accompanying
text supra. See also Vestal, supra note 55, at 492:
There is a matter of fundamental importance in the federal-state relationship which bars
the consideration of matters sua sponte by the . . . Court in a case coming from the
highest court of the state. . . . [The] power of review is limited not only to the question
whether a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution was denied. . . but to particu-
lar claims duly made below, and denied. ...
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Wood will not prevent the state court from reinstating its order revoking
the petitioners' probation once the state court is satisfied that the peti-
tioners were provided effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. 71 This freedom is vital in supporting the jurisdic-
tional authority exerted by the majority in Wood.
Justice White's contention in his dissent that the general review-of-
state-court jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3),72 is an absolute
jurisdictional bar to the Supreme Court reaching the due process issue,
ignores the presence of section 2106 and the need to construe these two
provisions together. Justice White did address section 2106, but only to
say that it "[d]oes not purport to expand the statutory limits. . .[but
rather] relates only to the disposition of the case once jurisdiction ex-
ists.''73 Justice White's view merely begs the question of how each of
these provisions should be interpreted in light of the other. Jurisdiction
did exist, via section 1257(3), for the petitioners' equal protection claim.
Once the Court obtained jurisdiction over the case, section 2106 author-
ized the result reached by the majority as long as it was "just under the
circumstances." Justice White provided no support for his narrow con-
struction of section 2106. If the majority actually interpreted the provi-
sion as Justice White suggested, section 2106 would be rendered
meaningless; the statutory authority to modify, reverse, or remand deci-
sions "as may be just under the circumstances" would add nothing to
existing federal jurisdiction. 74
Just as the majority was not able to cite persuasive precedent in
support of its application of section 2106, the three cases cited by Justice
White75 in support of his complete-jurisdictional-bar theory are also
readily distinguishable from Wood. In Cardinale v. Louisiana,76 the Court
referred to section 1257 (but not to section 2106) in rejecting the peti-
tioner's sole claim on the ground that it had not been decided in the
71 At that point, of course, petitioners would be free once again to petition for certiorari
on the equal protection claim originally granted a writ of certiorari by the Court.
72 See note 41 supra.
73 101 S. Ct. at 1107 (White, J., dissenting).
74 Cf. Nuelson v. Sorenson, 293 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1961) (reasoning applied to similar
argument aimed at sua sponte review of lower federal court decisions).
75 101 S. Ct. at 1106 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Hill v. California, 401
U.S. 797 (1971); and Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969)). See note 42 supra and
accompanying text.
76 In Cardinale, the Court refused to review the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute
because the state court had not had the opportunity to interpret it. The earlier cases out of
which the Cardinale line arose merely demonstrate that the § 2106 discretion of the Supreme
Court is exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances such as Wood, not that it is
absent. Moreover, none of the older cases cited in Cardinale addresses the discretionary power
granted by § 2106. Hill merely cited Cardinale and called it controlling in a similar circum-
stance. 401 U.S. at 805.
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state court. The Cardinale Court did not consider this new claim because
the state courts may have construed the statute in question so as to save
its constitutionality. Moreover, the state courts did not receive first op-
portunity to decide the question. 77 The situation in Wood is different
because no state statute which a state court could save by a particular
construction is involved in the result reached by the majority. Further-
more, the Wood Court did not decide a question which the Georgia
courts had been deprived of an opportunity to consider. Cuyler already
defined a trial court's duty of inquiry in the relevant situation.78 There-
fore, Wood decided no legal question but merely enforced a federal con-
stitutional standard. The Cardinale Court probably did not refer to
section 2106 because it saw no injustice. In Moore, the Court was
presented with a due process claim, concerning the admission of evi-
dence, which was first raised on appeal. Although the Court stated in
dictum that "[w]e could conclude. . . that the issue is not one properly
presented for review,"'79 it then went on to consider and reject the due
process claim.80 If anything, Moore supports the majority's view since
the Court did consider and decide the improperly presented due process
question. Moreover, the Court's statement in Moore suggests only a dis-
cretionary limit on its review power, hardly a complete jurisdictional
bar.
B. TRIAL COURT'S DUTY OF INQUIRY UNDER CUYLER V SULLIVAN
Justice White also claimed that the majority in Wood had exceeded
Cuyler v. Sullivan when it ordered a remand. He argued that no conflict
of interest of constitutional dimension appeared sufficiently possible
from the face of the record to have imposed the Cuyler duty of inquiry on
the trial court. Basically, Justice White contended that the Wood major-
ity went beyond the Cuyler v. Sullivan holding in reaching its remand
result.81 The strength of his argument varies between the two alternate
majority theories.
82
77 394 U.S. at 439:
Questions not raised below are those 6n which the record is very likely to be inadequate,
since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in mind. . . [I]t is important
that state courts be given the first opportunity to consider the applicability of state stat-
utes in light of constitutional challenge, since the statutes may be construed in a way
which saves their constitutionality. Or the issue may be blocked by an adequate state
ground.
78 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335. See note 2 supra.
79 408 U.S. at 799 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 799-800.
81 101 S. Ct. at 1104 n.18.
82 The majority held that the conflict of interest issue could be considered raised (by the
State's Solicitor) at the probation revocation hearing, and that even if it were not, the Court
could still consider this issue. Se text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
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If the petitioners had raised the due process issue below, Culer
would appear to mandate the vacated judgment which resulted in
Wood.8 3 A timely objection to counsel with an alleged conflict of inter-
est (the Holloway situation) may be distinct from a conflict argument
made by the opposing party (the Wood situation). Moreover, the proba-
tion revocation court in Wood was at least presented with allegations
which should have made it aware that an arguable conflict of interest
existed. Cuyer requires a trial judge to investigate counsel's interests
when he knows or should know of a conflict. Since the revocation judge
did nothing to ascertain whether an actual conflict existed, or whether
petitioners had waived their constitutional right to conflict-free counsel,
Justice Powell was correct in vacating the judgment of that court and
remanding. Under this scenario, the majority applied the rule exactly
as the letter and the spirit of Cuyler dictates.
On the other hand, if the Court based its holding on the alternative
theory that, although the conflict of interest question had not been
properly raised below, section 2106 still authorized the Court to find a
due process violation sua sponte, then Justice White may be correct in
questioning the basis for this holding. Under Cuyler, the probation revo-
cation judge was only required to inquire concerning possible conflict of
interest if he had reason to know that a particular conflict did exist. It is
at least arguable that an argument about a conflict from an adversarial
party (the State's Solicitor), without any agreement from the petitioners,
should not cause the judge to know that a particular conflict existed. An
adversarial party might have hidden strategy goals in raising such a con-
tention. For example, the jury's perception of the credibility of the de-
fense might be affected; the court or the defense might be distracted
from some point which was about to be made which would hurt the
prosecution; or, as in Wood, the prosecution might be using the argu-
ment to defeat some defense claim unrelated to the effective assistance of
counsel. 84 Furthermore, the petitioners' attorney expressly denied any
conflict of interest.85 One of the petitioners also testified that he selected
the attorney and trusted him.8 6 And finally, the litigation strategy em-
ployed by petitioners' attorney was not so obviously unreasonable that it
should have triggered the suspicion of the judge. Under this scenario,
83 In Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346, the Court declared that Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475
(1978), requires state trial courts to investigate timely objections to multiple representation in
order to assure effective assistance of counsel. Cuy/er extended the Holloway rule to situations
where the trial judge was not presented with timely objection but still knew or reasonably
should have known that a particular conflict existed. 446 U.S. at 347.
84 In Wood the state was attempting to counter the equal protection claim urged by peti-
tioners' counsel.
85 101 S. Ct. at 1109 n.8.
86 Id.
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Wood broadened the duty-of-inquiry rule to reach possible conflict situa-
tions that are much less obvious than those present in Holloway and
Cu.yler.
C. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The future implications of Wood may be far-reaching. From the
perspective of applying the Cuy/er rules, appellate courts may more
readily find that trial judges should have perceived particular conflicts.
To the degree that this results in more active trial court scrutiny of possi-
ble conflict situations, this result should provide greater protection from
ineffective counsel and should be welcomed.8 7 It may, however, lead to
judicial inefficiency associated with more frequent reversals in cases
where the judge did not inquire when faced with borderline indications
of possible conflict.
Wood may encourage greater utilization of section 2106 by federal
appellate courts that want to address issues sua sponte. On the other
hand, because Wood does not define when sua sponte consideration of
new issues is to be deemed '"just under the circumstances," it may also
contribute to a further split among the circuits in the manner in which
they use this provision. 8
V. CONCLUSION
Wood is noteworthy in two ways. First, greater discretion now exists
in the federal appellate courts to address issues not decided by state
courts below. After Wood, federal courts only need to find that their
inquiry is deemed "just under the circumstances." Wood, however, does
not adequately define what will constitute abuse of this judicial discre-
tion. Second, Wood also may have broadened the Cuyler rule as to when
87 See Note, .wpra note 2, at 537. "Presumably [Cuy/er] will promote the existing trend
among trial judges to make an affirmative inquiry [concerning possible attorney conflicts of
interest]. To the extent Cuyler advances this trend, only increased sixth amendment protec-
tion can result."
88 Butsee Webb v. Webb, 101 S.Ct. 1889 (1981), which indicates that invocation of§ 2106
review power may be limited to counsel conflicts-of-interest situations. In Wbb, the court (8-
1) dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted, failing to invoke § 2106 power. Arguably,
the unsuccessful petitioner in that case was denied the guarantees of the United States Consti-
tution, Article IV, § I Full Faith and Credit Clause, when the Georgia Supreme Court re-
fused to follow a Florida court's child custody judgment. The United States Supreme Court
could have invoked § 2106just as it did in Wood to remand to the Georgia courts for consider-
ation of the federal constitutional question. But in Webb there was no attorney with conflict-
ing interests who could have caused the federal issue not to be properly set up and preserved
below. Petitioner and her counsel were responsible for the context of their litigation and,
absent inadequate assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court refused to intervene. Justice
Powell concurred, following Wood and distinguishing Webb not fundamentally unfair. Id. at
1894.
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trial judges must inquire concerning possible attorney conflicts of inter-
est. Wood may be interpreted as holding that, absent timely objection
from the accused, trial judges must affirmatively ascertain whether a
conflict of interest exists, and whether or not the right of conflict-free
counsel has been validly waived, whenever they are presented with even
a slight indication of a possible conflict. To the degree that this results
in more alert and conscientious trial judges, increased sixth amendment
protection should result. But if, on the other hand, this results in more
reversals for failure to perceive the possible conflict, judicial inefficiency
will result. A better definition of the kind of conflict evidence which
triggers this duty of inquiry would be useful.
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